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1 Introduction 
The De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd' 
("De Beers") decision is important regarding the legal status of mine dumps 
or tailings dumps created by mining companies before the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 ("the MPRDA") came into 
operation. The concept "tailings" as a definition first appeared in section 1 of 
the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 ("the Minerals Act"), where it was defined as "any 
waste rock, slimes or residue derived from any mining operation or processing 
of any mineral". Before the Minerals Act dumps were simply referred to 
as "mine dumps". The MPRDA did not repeat the definition of "tailings", 
but introduced two new concepts namely "residue stockpile" and "residue 
deposit" without linking them to "tailings" as it occurred in the Minerals Act. 
The concept "residue stockpile" is defined as "any debris, discard, tailings, 
slimes, screening, slurry, waste rock, foundry sand, beneficiation plant waste, 
ash or any other product derived from or incidental to a mining operation 
and which is stockpiled, stored or accumulated for potential re-use, or which 
is disposed of, by the holder of a mining right, mining permit or production 
right". 2 The concept "residue deposit" means "any residue stockpile remaining 
at the termination, cancellation or expiry of a prospecting right, mining right, 
mining permit, exploration right or production right".3 It speaks for itself that 
the MPRDA applies to these two new concepts. Whether the MPRDA applies 
to mine dumps or tailings dumps created before inception of the MPRDA has 
become a pertinent legal issue. 
The court in De Beers decided that "tailings dumps" are not governed by the 
provisions of the MPRDA. Ownership of tailings dumps is determined by the 
common law principles of property law. It will be argued that the same would 
apply to tailings dumps created by holders of "old order mining rights" for a 
period of time after commencement of the MPRDA until eventual termination 
A discussion of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Ply) Ltd OPD 13-12-2007 case no 
3215/06. 
OPD 13-12-2007 case no 3215/06. 
S1. 
S 1. 
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in 1932. Treatment of accumulated pulsated tailings in the recovery plant 
continued up until the end of May 1932. As from January 1940, De Beers 
leased the New Company's assets and operated the Jagersfontein mine for its 
own account. No mining was done owing to the Second World War, but the 
re-treatment of old pulsated gravels continued up to October 1940. Shortly 
thereafter the mine was closed down and refitted and re-equipped with a new 
reduction plant. The reconditioned mine, which had been shut down for 17 
years, recommenced production in July 1949, and continued until 1971, when 
De Beers ceased the mining operations of the New Company. At the time, 
De Beers had full knowledge of the fact that the tailings dumps contained 
diamondiferous material which could, when economic circumstances were 
conducive to further exploitation, again be the subject of further mining 
operations.1O By notarial deed of cession on 20 September 1973 the New 
Company ceded the rights to all precious stones and all precious metals, base 
minerals, and oils in the farm to De Beers. Thereafter the mine was stripped 
of all treatment plant and equipment and the infrastructure for resuming 
underground operations was removed and sold off. In terms of another 
notarial agreement of cession executed on 8 October 1973, the New Company 
ceded to De Beers all its assets, whether immovable, movable, incorporeal or 
otherwise. A prospecting right (712006) in terms of the MPRDA was issued 
on 31 December 2006 to Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd ("Ataqua Mining") by the 
Deputy Director-General and the Minister of Minerals and Energy to prospect 
on the farm. 
The different rights existing or claiming to exist in respect of the farm and 
tailings dumps can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Rights in terms of a notarial lease whereby De Beers, since January 
1940, leased the New Company's assets, including certain land, mines 
and mining claims and operated the mine on the farm; 11 
(b) Ownership of all the assets of the New Company, whether movable, 
immovable or incorporeal by virtue of a notarial agreement of cession on 
8 October 1973 by the New Company;I2 
(c) Mineral rights in respect of precious stones, precious metals, base 
minerals and oil in respect of the farm held by De Beers by virtue of a 
registered notarial cession of mineral rights 0[20 September 1993 by the 
New Company;13 
(d) Prospecting permitI4 and mining authorisation15 in terms ofthe Minerals 
Act 50 of 1991, held by De Beers; 
(e) New order prospecting rights in respect of the farm held by Ataqua 
Mining; and 
(f) Ownership of the farm. 
10 Para 4. 
II Paras 4 and S. 
12 Para 6. 
13 Para 6. 
14 See para 68(iv). 
15 See para 68(iv). 
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De Beers applied for an order declaring that it is the owner of the tailings 
dumps on the farm and that Ataqua Mining was not entitled to conduct 
prospecting operations on the tailings dumps situated on the farm. De Beers 
applied for a further order that the decision of the Deputy Director-General 
and the Minister be reviewed and set aside. 16 The application was granted by 
the Orange Free State Provincial division of the High Court of South Africa.17 
Due to non compliance with the requirements of the MPRDA/8 the decision 
of the Deputy Director-General and the Minister to grant a prospecting right 
to Ataqua Mining and the prospecting right was reviewed and set aside by the 
court.19 This explains the exit of Ataqua Mining from the proceedings.20 The 
non-compliance by Ataqua Mining and especially the officials of the State 
with requirements of the MPRDA and the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000, though a cause for concern, will not be further discussed. 
The legal questions to be decided in the De Beers case were: (a) whether 
the diamonds found in tailings dumps, containing diamondiferous material on 
the farm, "are diamonds or minerals for purposes of the interpretation of the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,,;21 and (b) ownership of 
the tailings dumps, which originated from ore mined on the farm by the New 
Company and De Beers.22 
3 Ownership of a tailings dump 
Determination of ownership of a tailings dump depends on whether the 
tailings dump is movable or immovable. If movable, it belongs to the mining 
company that lawfully severed the ore and minerals, unless abandonment of 
ownership has taken place. If immovable, the owner of the land would be the 
owner of the tailings dump. Determining whether tailings dumps are to be 
considered as movables or part of the land is determined by the principles of 
building (inaedificatio) as a form of accession. Whether accession has taken 
place is determined by considering the following factors: (a) the nature and 
purpose of the movable; (b) the degree and manner of its annexation to the soil; 
and (c) the intention ofthe owner of the movable with regard to the attachment 
of his movable to the soiL 23 
In De Beeri4 it was held, with reference to the criteria for determining 
whether accession has taken place that the tailings dumps are to be considered 
as movables. This was despite the nature of the tailings dumps and the manner 
of annexation. The tailings dumps were capable of acceding to the land and it 
is trite law that accession can even take place by mere weight. 25 The tailings 
dumps were enormous, similar in size to some of the surrounding natural 
16 Paras 1 and 2. 
\7 Para 68. 
18 See paras 9-13. 
19 See paras 2 and 19. 
20 Para 4. 
21 Para 8. 
n Paras 4 and 5. 
13 Van del' Merwe "Things" in LAWSA 27 (2001) para 337. 
24 Para 25. 
25 See Macdonald Ltdv Radin and the Potchefttroom Dairies and Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 466. 
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koppies.26 They were left there for more than a century.27 The tailings dumps 
were, however, found to be distinguishable from the surface of the farm and 
were capable of being removed without injuring the land.28 In other words, 
according to the two tests used to determine whether the second criteria is 
decisive, it did not form an integral part of the land and could be removed 
without substantial injury to the land or old tailings.29 The court found that 
neither the New Company nor De Beers, when it conducted the business of the 
New Company for its own account, had an intention to discard the tailings and 
to attach them permanently to the land.30 According to the court, the intention 
was clearly to own and retain the ownership of the minerals mined which had 
been treated or which could in the future be treated with better technology 
and more favourable economic considerations.3l The court reasoned that the 
"modern approach" to the application ofthe criteria for accession, as suggested 
by Nienaber JA in Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) 
Bpk32 ("Konstanz Properties"), must be followed?3 Accordingly, in terms of 
the modern approach, the sUbjective intention or ipse dixit is paramount. The 
nature of the tailings dumps and the way in which the dumps were affixed, 
are, as a question of degree, only indicative of the intention.34 The court found 
that the intention was that the tailings dumps should be regarded as movables, 
and that the ipse dixit was, therefore, determinant of the question. The next 
question to be considered was whether the other factors 35 were indicative 
of the intention of De Beers at the time of the annexation that they should 
be considered as movables.36 The court was of the opinion that the first 
and second requirements37 are both compatible with and indicative of that 
intention.38 The court was satisfied that the tailings dumps were movables 
which were owned by De Beers.39 
Some general points of criticism can be noted: 
(a) Apparently the court did not consider the well known criticism against 
the decisive emphasis that is being placed on the intention of the owner of 
the movable in terms of the modern approach.40 The Appellate Division 
in Konstanz Properties already expressed its Willingness in future to 
consider aspects of accession, such as the question whether the intention 
of the owner of the movable or the annexor, is the relevant one.4l 
26 Para 23. 
27 Para 24. 
28 Para 23. 
29 See Van der Merwe LAWSA 27 para 337. 
30 Para 19. 
31 Para 19. 
32 1996 3 SA 273 (A). 
33 Para 25. 
34 Para 25. 
35 Namely, the nature of the tailings dumps and the manner in which the dumps are affixed. 
36 Para 25. 
37 The court actually referred to the second and third requirements, which seems incorrect. 
38 Para 25. 
39 Para 25. 
40 See in general, Van der Merwe LAWSA 27 para 339. 
41 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 3 SA 273 (A) 282B and 2840. 
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(b) Decisive emphasis was placed on the ipse dixit of De Beers regarding the 
tailings dumps. As will be indicated in 432 below, De Beers only could 
have acquired ownership of the movable tailings dumps by delivery with 
the short hand during 1973. Only from this moment (and not earlier when 
it conducted the business of the New Company for its own account) could 
the intention of De Beers as owner of the movable dumps be taken into 
account for purposes of the third criteria to determine whether accession 
of a movable to land has taken place. Prior to that date De Beers was 
merely a lessee of the New Company's assets, including certain land, 
mines and mining claims and operated the mine on the farm. 
(c) Apparently the court did not take note of the views of Franklin and 
Kaplan 42 that due to the uniqueness of mine dumps, the application of 
the three factors of accession to mine dumps is more complex and do 
not provide a true or useful analogy to the case of mine dumps. Briefly, 
as to the physical features, the nature of a mine dump is such that it 
is capable of effective attachment to land by its mere weight. Planting 
of grass and vegetation on mine dumps is required by environmental 
legislation.43 Removal of a mine dump does not cause damage to the 
land or the dump because the sand and waste rock in the dump may be 
used and sold for commercial purposes, and the physical condition of the 
land may be restored to its previous condition. Due to the existence and 
accumulation of a mine dump over long periods of time, as in the present 
case, it may be difficult to determine the intention of successive mining 
companies that produced the mine dump(s). 
(d) The court could have relied on Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd v GF Industrial 
Proprietary Co (Pty) Ltct4 for its approach that the subjective intention 
of the owner of the tailings dump is paramount in the determination 
of whether accession of a tailings dump has taken place. In its day the 
Simmer and Jack Mines decision, however, did not escape a fair amount 
of academic criticism.45 
4 1 State custodianship 
The court held that the "the MPRDA leaves no doubt that mining rights in 
respect of minerals which have not been mined, have been taken out of private 
hands, and that such rights vest in the custodianship of the state ... ".46 The 
42 The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982). See also Badenhorst, Mostert & Dendy "Minerals 
and Petroleum" in LAWSA 182 ed (2007) para 92. 
43 Sonnekus "Mynhoop as Roerende Saak - Aanhegting - Eiendomsreg Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd v GF 
Industrial Proprietary Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 654 (W)" 1978 De Jure 390 392 points out that one should 
not be blinded by the statutory reason for planting grass but one should rather attach weight to the factual 
reality of growing grass. 
44 19782 SA 654 (W) 658D-F. 
45 Van der Merwe "Law of Property (including Mortgage and Pledge)" 1978 Annual Survey 290 304; Lewis 
"Superficius Solo Cedit - Sed Quid Est Superficies?" 1979 SALJ94 104-105; Schoeman "Simmer and 
Jack Mines Ltd v GF Industrial Proprietary Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 654 (W) - Mynhoop - Roerend of 
Onroerend ~ Riglyne" 1978 THRHR 449; Sonnekus 1978 De Jure 390. See further Franklin & Kaplan 
Mining and Mineral Laws 52-54. 
46 Para 67. 
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court merely cited sections 2 and 3 of the MPRDA as authority for its view.47 
Section 2(b) has as an objective of the MPRDA, to give effect to "the principle 
of the State's custodianship of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources". 
Section 3(1) states that the "mineral and petroleum resources are the common 
heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the custodian thereof 
for the benefit of all South Africans". In terms of section 3(2), the State as the 
custodian of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources, acting through the 
Minister, may grant rights to minerals and petroleum to exploit mineral and 
petroleum resources. The holder of a mining right may enter the land, prospect 
and mine for his or her own account on or under that land for the mineral for 
which the right has been granted and remove and dispose such mineral.48 The 
entitlements by virtue of a mining right is exactly the same as the entitlements 
that the holder of a common law mineral right had.49 Whilst section 3(1) refers 
to custodianship of minerals (or mineral resources),50 section 3(2) refers to 
rights to (mine, own and sell) minerals. The court did not express itself about 
ownership of unsevered minerals in terms of section 3(1). The court seems 
to acknowledge an "expropriation" of mineral rights and vesting thereof in 
the custodianship of the state. The meaning of section 3 of the MPRDA has 
been the subject of much academic discussion5! and needs to be examined 
by the courts in future. At present this issue falls beyond the scope of our 
discussion. 
The result and the purpose of the MPRDA are to terminate all privately 
owned common law rights to minerals in respect ofland. Once this is accepted, 
the following questions can be raised: why would the rights to minerals in 
tailings dumps be excluded from such termination? Why would minerals 
like diamonds occurring in a tailings dump not fall under the custodianship 
of mineral resources? Is it because this resource is at times movable and! 
or privately owned? Such a distinction does not appear from the MPRDA 
itself. Theoretically, in terms of the common law maxim cuius est solum eius 
est usque ad coelum et ad in/eros private ownership of un severed minerals 
vested in owners of land. 52 Whether this maxim has been abolished by the 
MPRDA and whether ownership is still vested in the owner of land is part of 
the academic debate referred to above which remains unanswered. 
4 2 Applicability of the MPRDA 
According to the court the "central question in this case is whether the 
MPRDA deprives the applicant of the ownership of the minerals in its tailings 
47 Para 67. 
48 S 5(3) of the MPRDA. 
49 See Badenhorst & Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa (2004) 3-11-3-12. 
50 It is submitted that whether the word "resources" appears in the MPRDA or not would not make a 
difference. 
S] For a discussion of the differing views, see Badenhorst & Mostert "Artike13(l) en (2) van die Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 280[2002: 'n Herbeskouing" 2007 TSAR 476 and Van der Schyff 
"Who "owns" the Country's Mineral Resources? The Possible Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine 
through the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act" 2008 TSAR 757. 
52 See Badenhorst & Mostert Mineral Law 1-9-1-10. 
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dumps".53 The court held that there are several reasons why tailing dumps, 
and in particular the applicant's tailing dumps which form the subject matter 
of this case, are not subject to control by the MPRDA. 54 
4 3 Reasoning of the court 
The reasoning of the court can be restated under the following headings: 
4 3 1 Tailings dumps 
The nature of a tailings dump was found to be as follows by the court: 
tailings dumps do not occur naturally in or on the earth. They are formed 
by the placement of processed and partly processed materials in order to be 
re-worked in future years when technology improves. 55 The tailings dumps are 
perceived as being movable. Diamonds occurring in movable tailings dumps 
do not occur "naturally in or on the earth".56 Tailings are to be regarded as a 
unique place in which minerals can be found after someone has removed them 
from the earth and processed them to some extent. Minerals that have not yet 
been mined differ from tailings by occurring in the earth in the sense of being 
a bonus to the owner of land. If they were undiscovered when the landowner 
bought the land, they were acquired without being part of the purchase price. 
Tailings are different because the owner of the tailings is entitled to extract 
the minerals by improved means.57 A tailings dump is made, kept, sold and 
bought because of the knowledge that it contains valuable material. The court 
found that minerals in the tailings dumps had such a value to De Beers.58 
We agree that tailings are by nature unnatural or man-made structures. 
There is, however, an argument to be made that the diamonds contained in 
the mother kimberlite rock still occurred naturally in the mother rock in the 
tailings dump on the earth, and as such was subject to new or "old order mining 
rights".59 If the diamonds were not still in the mother rock or kimberlite in 
their natural possession but on another location on the earth they would have 
been visible to the eye. It seems as if the concept of 'occurring naturally' 
was not properly considered or correctly interpreted. The source of diamonds 
are kimberlite pipes and diamonds are only found in kimberlite pipes or in 
alluvial deposits because as the diamond pipes weathered the diamonds were 
moved from the kimberlite source or mother rock by water to be deposited on 
another location in what is called alluvial gravel. In the case of alluvials the 
diamonds are not situated or covered by smaller dimensions of the mother 
rock as is the case in diamondiferous tailings dumps derived from the mining 
of kimberlite pipes. The argument is thus that the diamonds in the tailings 
dumps in casu are still covered by the mother rock where it occurred naturally 
53 Para 67. 
54 Para 68. 
55 Para 68(ii). 
56 Para 68(i). 
57 Para 68(xii). 
58 Para 68(x). 
59 See, however the finding of the court in 4 3 3 below. 
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for hundreds of years but only at another location on the earth. If they were 
not in the natural kimberlite mother rock then it would be possible to retrieve 
these diamonds through a washing process like alluvial diamonds and not a 
crushing process when diamonds are retrieved from kimberlite rock. If the 
Roads Department does massive earth moving when constructing a road and 
puts the soil that they are so moving at another location then any minerals 
occurring in that soil will not be the subject of the MPRDA because the soil is 
not in its natural position anymore.60 The Department of Minerals and Energy 
in practice grants mining permits in terms of the MPRDA for dump recovery 
purposes despite the De Beers decision. 
4 3 2 Ownership of tailings dumps 
The court found that diamonds in the are were severed by De Beers or its 
predecessor in title from the mother rock. Upon such severance the ore became 
a new object. According to the court such severance vested ownership in the 
mineral title holder, De Beers, before the MPRDA came into operation.61 The 
court could have relied on Trojan Exploration Co v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
LtJ2 for this statement of law. The court found that the tailings dumps have 
been owned by De Beers since 1973 and such ownership was undisputed.63 
The court also found that De Beers has spent money and labour and time on 
these tailings dumps.64 According to the court the Minerals Act recognised 
De Beer's ownership of the tailings dumps. Reference is made to section 9(1) 
of the Minerals Act which provided for the issuing of a mining authorisation 
for "land or tailings".65 
It is submitted that only ownership of ore actually mined by De Beers could 
have vested in it. The other tailings dumps were purchased by De Beers. Ore 
mined by the New Company was acquired in ownership by it in its capacity 
as the miner. The court found earlier that for purposes of inaedijicatio the 
mine and tailings dumps on the farm were movable. Ownership of all the 
assets of the New Company was purported to be transferred to De Beers by 
virtue of a notarial agreement of cession on 8 October 1973. Real rights to 
land may be transferred from one person to another by means of a notarial 
deed of cession.66 Transfer of ownership of movables can, however, only be 
effected by one of the recognised forms of delivery.67 As a lessee since 1940, 
De Beers, being already in possession of the mine dumps, probably acquired 
ownership of the tailings dumps and other movables during 1973 by delivery 
with the short hand (traditio brevi manu). This was never proven by De Beers 
in court. Only then can it be stated and accepted that De Beer's ownership 
60 It is assumed in our example that the Roads Department has not been exempted from some of the 
provisions of the MPRDA in terms of section 106(1) of the MPRDA. 
61 Para 68(xi). 
62 19964 SA 499 (A) 509J-51OA. 
63 Para 68(iii) and (x). 
64 Para 68(iii). 
65 Para 68(iv). 
66 S 16 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
67 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 's The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 73. 
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would be fully undisputed. The conclusion of the court in this regard seems to 
be unfounded. If New Company abandoned the tailings dumps then it did not 
form part ofthe movable assets that New Company sold to De Beers. The New 
Company did not work these dumps for many years and probably never had the 
intention to do so otherwise their allegedly valuable assets should have been 
specifically listed, which apparently was not the case. Whilst identification 
of tailings dumps take place in practice by notarial agreements, it remains 
important that transfer of ownership of (movable) tailings dumps takes place 
by virtue of one of the recognised forms of delivery of movables. Compliance 
with the requirements of such modes of delivery has to be proven in a court 
of law. If the transferee is not yet in possession, delivery with the long hand 
(traditio tonga manu) could be resorted to if the requirements for this form of 
delivery have been met. The fruits of labour as age old theoretical justification 
for the institution of ownership were certainly present on the philosophical 
plane due to the labour and money expended by (the New Company and) De 
Beers as a mining company over the years. 
It should be noted that what the Minerals Act recognised under the definition 
of a "holder" in section 1 was a "right to a mineral which occurs in or on 
tailings". A sequence to establish who the "holder of the right to a mineral 
which occurs in or on tailings" was established: firstly, the holder of the 
mining right from which the tailings were produced. Secondly, if such holder 
does not exist, or if the tailings or mining right has been separately alienated, 
then the common law owner. Thirdly, failing such common law owner, or ifhe 
is unknown or cannot readily be traced, then the owner of the land on which 
the tailings is situated.68 The mining authorisation merely allowed a holder 
of a mineral right or a mining right to exercise the entitlement of mining. The 
same would have applied to the holder of a right to a mineral which occurs in 
a tailings dump upon the issue of a mining authorisation. 
4 3 3 Tailings and the MPRDA 
Following a purposive interpretation by looking at the history and origin of 
the MPRDA, the White Paper and the objects of the Act, the court held that 
those sources are silent on tailings. There is no reference to tailings indicating 
that mineral rights in tailings fall under the custodianship of the state in terms 
of the MPRDA. The purpose of the MPRDA Act is not defeated or notably 
reduced by excluding tailings dumps from its operation.69 Tailings dumps 
cannot be considered a casus omissus because no absurdity follows if tailings 
are excluded. According to the court it is quite easy to give full and proper 
effect to the MPRDA if tailings are left out. It was explained that the MPRDA 
targets mining rights in unsevered minerals in the ground, not in tailings 
which have been mined?O The court reasoned that in enacting the MPRDA 
the legislature must have contemplated that environmental legislation, such as 
68 Definition of holder with reference to a right to a mineral which occur in a tailings in s 1 of the Minerals 
Act 50 of 1991; Kaplan & Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 1991 (1992) 26. 
69 Para 68(v). 
70 Para 68(viii). 
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the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, would adequately 
regulate the processing of minerals from dumps created before 2002. The 
processing of minerals from dumps is, therefore, not an unregulated activity?l 
The court held that the MPRDA did not want to regulate tailings dumps. 
There is no continuation of the regime created by the Minerals Act in respect 
of tailings dumps.72 The transitional provisions of the MPRDA in schedule II 
do not continue De Beer's prospecting permit under section 6 of the Minerals 
Act.73 
We are ofthe view that the mining and processing of a mine dump or tailings 
dump created before the commencement of the MPRDA are not governed by 
the provisions of the MPRDA because such mine dump or tailings dump does 
not constitute a "residue stockpile" or a "residue deposit" being "mined" for 
purposes of the MPRDA. This would mean that the processing and mining of 
such mine dumps or tailings dumps are not subject to acquisition of mining 
rights in terms of the MPRDA, stringent environmental requirements and black 
economic empowerment provisions of the MPRDA, and delays in obtaining 
the necessary authorisations. We agree that such activities are, however, still 
subject to compliance with South African environmental laws in general. 
The court pointed out that the MPRDA, has a clear definition of a "residue 
stockpile".74 According to the court "mining" of a tailings dump is in fact 
"processing" for purposes of the MPRDA.75 Processing is seen by the court 
as the winning of a mineral. The court held that tailings are not part of the 
heritage of the people of South Africa to which section 3(1) of the MPRDA 
refers?6 The court found that the MPRDA did nothing to detract from De 
Beer's rights to the tailings dumps.77 
A finding that the state is now the custodian of the minerals remaining in 
tailings dumps, would according to the court amount to expropriation, which 
is not expressly provided for and cannot be inferred to have been contemplated 
by the legislature. It is indicated by the court that our law requires that a 
strict construction be placed upon statutory provisions which interfere with 
elementary rights. If the legislature intended to take away private rights in 
tailings dumps, which have existed for more than a hundred years, it would 
according to the court have stated so clearly and unambiguously.78 
The argument that, if there has been an expropriation, De Beers has a 
right to compensation under schedule II item 12 is perceived as fallacious 
by the court. It was argued that no expropriation took place but merely the 
termination of De Beer's "old order prospecting right" due to the failure of 
De Beers to apply for conversion of its rights. The reason for the failure to 
apply was the view of De Beers that the MPRDA does not apply to the tailings 
1\ Para 68(ix). 
12 Para 68(iv). 
73 Para 68(iv). 
74 Para 68(iv). 
75 Para 68(iv). 
76 Para 68(x.ii). 
17 Para 68(xi). 
78 Para 68(vi). 
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dumps in question because they are movable assets which were not produced 
under the MPRDA?9 
Occurrence of diamonds in ore was not at issue according to the court. 
In order for diamonds in the tailings dumps to be considered "minerals" for 
purpose of the MPDRA (and therefore vesting under custodianship of the 
state) they must be found to be occurring naturally in the earth. According 
to the court the fact that they still occur naturally in the ore is irrelevant for 
purposes of the definition of "mineral" in the MPRDA. 80 A finding that it is 
relevant would have changed the outcome of the case and may be the correct 
decision. 
It is true that the MPRDA does not deal with "tailings" but only with 
"mineral resources", "residue stockpiles" and "residue deposits". The court's 
explanation of this failure on the part of the legislature is debatable. Another 
explanation is that the definition of "tailings" in the Minerals Act was simply 
not aligned with the definitions of "residue deposits" and "residue stockpiles". 
Another example of the carelessness of the legislature with definitions in the 
MPRDA is the retention of the definition of "topsoil" from the Minerals Act 
without it being linked to the definition of mineraL On such explanation, 
custodianship of a broader mineral resource (including minerals contained 
in "tailings") may just as well have been the purpose of the wide sweeping 
MPRDA. The court's reference to a permit under section 6 seems to suggest that 
the transitional provisions of the MPRDA in schedule II did not continue De 
Beer's prospecting permit. If such a prospecting permit existed it was subject 
to the transitional provisions of the MPRDA. The transitional provisions of 
the MPRDA do, however, not expressly make provision for the conversion 
of "right to a mineral which occurs in or on tailings". The court's reference 
to "mineral rights in tailings" may be confusing in the light of the rights to 
tailings recognised under the Minerals Act. Such rights should have suffered 
the same institutional expropriation fate as common law mineral rights, the 
reason being that expropriations in terms of the MPRDA could also take place 
if holders of mineral rights or other rights were excluded on 1 May 2004 from 
the transitional provisions in the sense that they did not become holders of 
"old order rights". 81 
Whilst it is correct that a finding that the state is also custodian of tailings 
dumps would constitute expropriation of ownership of such movables, it must 
be remembered that the legislature did not hesitate to expropriate "old order 
rights", especially "unused old order rights". The custodianship of the state 
over mineral resources82 and rights to minerals83 amounts to an expropriation 
of (old order) mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights which is 
only constitutional because of the transitional arrangements of the MPRDA 
and, especially, the compensation which is provided for in item 12 of the 
79 Para 68(vii). 
80 Para 68(xi). 
81 See Dale et al Mineral and Petroleum Law sch II-2ID. 
82 S 3(1) ofthe MPRDA. 
83 S 3(2). 
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transitional arrangements. 84 Expropriation of minerals in movable tailings 
dumps may not have been contemplated by the legislature as transitional 
measures for such movable tailings dumps are absent. If it was contemplated 
it would have been unconstitutionaL 85 
In looking at remedies available to De Beers a distinction should be drawn 
between their ownership of the movable tailings dump and their "old order 
rights" in respect of the farm. The court is correct to say that as owner of 
the movable tailings dump De Beers was not expropriated and need not have 
resorted to compensation under item 12 of the transitional arrangements to the 
MPRDA. As holder of "old order rights" De Beers was, however, subject to 
the transitional arrangements and could, but have not chosen to do so, follow 
the transitional route. 
From the definition of a "mineral,,86 one may deduce that in order for any 
substance to qualify as a mineral for purposes of the MPRDA the following 
requirements have to be satisfied, namely:87 the substance (a) must either be 
in solid, liquid or gaseous form; (b) has (i) to occur naturally in or on the 
earth, in or under water; and (ii) to have been formed by, or subjected to, a 
geological process; or (c) has to occur in residue stockpiles or residue deposits. 
Sand, stone, rock, gravel and clay are minerals. Water per se, petroleum and 
peat are, however, not minerals. For purposes of the definition of a "mineral" 
in the MPRDA, a mineral either occurs naturally in the earth or under water 
or in a "residue stockpile" or "residue deposit". The tailings dump or the 
diamonds contained by the tailings dump do not occur naturally in the earth. 
A tailings dump is also not a "residue deposit" or a "residue stockpile" for 
purposes of the MPRDA. The crux of the decision is that minerals in tailings 
dumps do not occur naturally in the earth or in such "residue stockpile" or 
residue deposits". The definitions of "residue stockpile" and "residue deposit" 
in the MPRDA refer only to "residues" produced by virtue of an exploration 
right,88 mining permit, mining right (or production right) granted in terms of 
the Act. Tailings dumps not so produced, therefore, are not regulated in terms 
of the MPRDA. 89 Thus, the diamonds found in tailings dumps, containing 
diamondiferous material on the farm, are not diamonds or minerals for 
purposes of the MPRDA. 
5 Summary 
In the determination whether accession of a mine dump or tailings dump 
has taken place, it seems as if the new approach towards inaedificatio will 
be followed by the courts. As to the determining factors, it should be kept 
84 Agri SA and Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy NOP 06-03-2009 cases no 5589612007 and 
1023512008 (unreported decision of the North and South Gauteng High Court, Pretoria) para 11. For 
a discussion of this decision, see Badenhorst "Expropriations by Virtue of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act: Are There Some More Trees in the Forest?" 2009 TSAR 600. 
B5 See Agri SA and Van Rooyen v Minister of Mineral and Energy NOP 06-03-2009 cases no 5589612007 and 
1023512008 para I L 
86 S 1. 
87 Badenhorst & Mostert Mineral Law 13-8-13-8A; Badenhorst & Shone 2008 Obiter 44. 
88 Only with reference to the definition of a "residue deposit". 
89 Dale et al Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-190. 
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in mind that the purpose of such tailings dumps is not to serve the land 
permanently because due to new technology such dumps can be reprocessed 
and mined. Whether this was always intended by different mining companies 
at different times and decades ago is debatable. Reprocessing of tailings dumps 
take place on a large scale in South Africa. A dump is considered viable for 
reprocessing when 0.4 grams of gold can be obtained from every ton. For 
instance, the familiar mine dumps south of Johannesburg are disappearing 
due to reprocessing. The 200 dumps scattered in and around the city are the 
remains of mine workings from the birth of Johannesburg in 1886. Some 
170 million tons of sand have so far been removed from the dumps, and the 
plan is to eventually remove them all, and in the process, change the face of 
south Johannesburg.9o The legal status of mine dumps and tailings dumps, 
as determined in the De Beers decision, will expedite this process which is to 
be welcomed from an economical, environmental, job creation and aesthetic 
perspective. 
A "residue stockpile" created by a holder of a mining permit, mining right 
or production right in terms of the MPRDA and a "residue deposit" remaining 
at the termination of a prospecting right, exploration right, mining permit, 
mining right or production right are governed by the MPRDA. "Mining" 
of such a "residue deposit" is also governed by the MPRDA. A mine dump 
or tailings dump created before the commencement of the MPRDA and the 
processing and mining thereof is, however, not governed by the provisions of 
the MPRDA because such mine dump or tailings dump does not constitute 
a "residue stockpile" or a "residue deposit" being "mined" for purposes of 
the MPRDA. The processing and mining of such mine dumps or tailings 
dumps are not subject to acquisition of prospecting or mining rights in terms 
of the MPRDA, stringent environmental requirements and black economic 
empowerment provisions ofthe MPRDA, and delays in obtaining the necessary 
authorisations. Such activities are still subject to compliance with South 
African environmental, health and safety laws in general. It is submitted that 
the MPRDA would only be applicable to "residues" created by holders of (new 
order) rights in terms of the MPRDA. Tailings dumps created by holders of 
"old order rights" during the five year period of transition before termination 
of "old order mining rights" would by analogy also not be subject to the 
provisions of the MPRDA. Such termination of "old order mining rights" will 
take place either during the five year period of transition upon: (i) conversion 
into and registration of new order mining rights, (ii) refusal of an application 
for conversion by the Minister or (iii) termination of unconverted "old order 
mining rights" on 30 April 2009. The reason for such additional period is 
that item 7(7) of the transitional arrangements to the MPRDA determines that 
the "old order mining right" only ceases to exist upon conversion of the "old 
order mining right" and the registration of the mining right into which it was 
converted. The holder must lodge the converted mining right within 90 days 
from the date on which he or she received notice of conversion at the Mineral 
90 Davie "Johannesburg's Mine Dumps Bite the Dust" http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2004/2004-
01-27-0I.asp (accessed 22-03-2009). 
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and Petroleum Titles Registration Office for registration. 91 Simultaneously, 
the "old order mining right" must be lodged at the Deeds Office or Mineral 
and Petroleum Titles Registration Office for deregistration.92 Termination of 
the "old order mining right" may even be after 30 April 2009, namely, until 
approval of the conversion to a new order mining right by the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy and registration thereof in the Mineral and Petroleum 
Titles Registration Office which period in practice could take more than 
a year. Application for conversion of the "old order mining right" must, 
however, have taken place prior to 31 April 2009. Such "old order mining 
right" remains valid until refusal or granting of the application for conversion 
and registration in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office. 
The legislature intends to undo the De Beers decision by substitution of 
the definitions of "residue deposit" and "residue stockpile" in the MPRDA 
by reference not only to new order rights but also to "old order rights" in the 
respective new definitions.93 Working and reprocessing of mine dumps prior 
to the commencement of the proposed amendments will still amount to be 
"working in the past". Whether such amendments will apply retrospectively 
to mine dumps or tailings dumps created within the abovementioned periods 
will, however, not be further discussed at present. 
6 Conclusion 
The court in De Beers did not express itself about ownership of unsevered 
minerals in terms of section 3(1) of the MPRDA. This fundamental question, 
the subject of differing academic views, remains unanswered. 
The De Beers decision has far reaching consequences. Mine dumps or 
tailings dumps created upon the exercise of "old order mining rights" before the 
commencement of the MPRDA and, it is submitted, even after commencement 
of the MPRDA until eventual termination ofthe "old order mining rights", are 
not subject to the extensive, mining, environmental, empowerment provisions 
of the MPRDA. Termination of "old order mining rights" takes place upon: 
(i) refusal of an application for conversion of a milling right during (or even 
after) the period oftransition, (ii) conversion into and registration of new order 
mining rights during (or even after) the period of transition or (iii) termination 
of unconverted "old order mining rights" on 30 April 2009. The legal status 
of these tailings dumps is simply determined by application of the common 
law principles regarding accession. If upon such application it is found that a 
tailings dump is movable, it remains important that transfer of ownership of 
(movable) tailings dumps takes place by virtue of one of the recognised forms 
of delivery of movables. Mere identification of tailings dumps in practice by 
notarial agreements would not qualify as such form of delivery of movables. 
Processing of these dumps will, however, still be subject to compliance 
with South African environmental, health and safety laws in general. To the 
91 Item 7(5) of the MPRDA. 
92 Item 7(5) of the MPRDA. 
93 S 1 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 2008 published in GG 32151 
of 2009-04-21. 
